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N ehon', P'P" "temp" to 'pe<;Jy how 
we might identifY the hard cases of animal experi-
mentation and draw preliminary conclusions 
about the ethics of such experimentation. Mter 
identifYing conditions for research to be "exem-
plary" and arguing that research concerning dia-
betes mellitus is reasonably viewed as exemplary 
research, he considers how such research might 
be regarded from both utilitarian and nonutili-
tarian stances. Most of his attention is focused on 
nonutilitarian approaches, and some valuable 
insights are offered concerning the conditions 
under which we might be morally justified in con-
DISCUSSION 
scripting individuals (of other species or our 
own) for medical research. I am in agreement 
with what Nelson is aiming to accomplish in this 
paper, and in large part with the details. My com-
ments are intended to focus attention on some 
areas which I found either particularly 
provocative or in need of clarification. In par-
ticular, I shall focus on the problem of utilitarian 
calculations, the concept of exemplary research, 
and finally on conscription. 
Utilitarian Calculations 
Nelson correctly points out that a utilitarian 
reading of diabetes research will be enormously 
difficult if it is serious: any kind of accurate com-
parison of utilities in this case must tackle such 
difficult problems as that of making interspecific 
comparisons of utilities. In lieu of the ability to 
adequately calculate, he considers it not irre-
sponsible to conclude that research on diabetes 
is justified by the consequences. But nothing may 
be concluded from this, for there is still a serious 
question of the fairness of the distribution of 
burdens and benefits of diabetes research, i.e., of 
the adequacy of act utilitarianism. 
I wonder whether we should be so sanguine 
about such a judgment that research is justified 
by utilitarianism. If we accept the inaccessibility 
of cautious comparisons of utilities it seems more 
appropriate to argue that appeal to such benefits 
should not be used in justifYing research, espe-
cially since appeals to benefits without 
accounting for costs and for whether they shall 
be distributed fairly do not justifY actions. 
In clarifYing the utilitarian situation Nelson 
accepts the point that the proper unit for analysis 
is not the particular research project but "the 
whole institution." Though he does not explain 
why this is an appropriate shift, I suspect it may 
relate to the problem of serendipity, since Fox 
and McCloskey, for example, make this shift for 
that reason (Fox, 193-43; McCloskey, 66). Useful 
results may be stumbled upon in the context of 
looking for something altogether different, or 
some general information about physiological 
processes may turn out to have unforeseen rele-
vance to a later advance. Ifwe cannot predict the 
importance of research beforehand, then utilities 
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U ntil animals become members of our 
community in more meaningful 
senses than simply serving our 
needs and interests, the 
justification for conscription 
looks more like the 
enslavement of an outsider than 
the unfortunate but necessary 
conscription of one of our own 
community. 
cannot be calculated on a case by case basis. Of 
course, we might say retrospectively that research 
was or was not beneficial, but our judgment must 
be prospective if ethical reflection is to help us 
decide what to do. 
Should we shift to the "whole institution" of 
research as the proper unit of analysis in order to 
solve this problem? Does this include all medical 
research or just that research concerned with 
diabetes? Nelson's comment that we need to con-
sider "the en tire stream of research that flows 
into and out of [Banting and Best's] work with 
all its reefs and obstructions" suggests that he has 
in mind something narrower than all of medical 
research. But how narrow, and how will it be 
selected? Is it the entire history of diabetes 
research, a particular research program targeting 
one kind of diabetes problem (such as attempts 
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to encourage regeneration of insulin-producing 
cells) or perhaps something in between? Even 
intuitive utilitarian conclusions require a clear 
sense of what the relevant facts are. 
The Concept of Exemplary Research 
The idea of exemplary medical research is 
important: it is clear that the central and 
toughest ethical issue resides in the kind of case 
Nelson wants to focus on. Though there is not 
universal agreement about the cases of product 
testing and the like, these are more peripheral to 
the hard questions that critics of using animals 
for human benefit must face. Surely it is in the 
use of animals in research we might call "exem-
plary" that a justification may be found for using 
animals as resources or tools, if one is to be 
found anywhere. 
Should we accept that diabetes is exemplary 
research? Nelson defines exemplary research as 
research that targets widespread, debilitating dis-
eases, has an admirable track record in using 
animals to aid in our understanding and man-
agement of the disease, and is conducted 
according to humane standards as they are cur-
rently understood. He offers the discovery of 
insulin as indicating the successful track record 
of diabetes animal research. 
One might wish to raise questions about the 
historical claims made on behalf of the discovery 
of insulin through animal research, as for 
example Dr. Robert Sharpe has (Sharpe, 21-68). 
Claims on behalf of animal research are some-
times overblown by proponents. For example, 
while chemical therapies and vaccines have 
enabled many people to avoid contracting a 
number of infectious diseases, such as whooping 
cough, measles, and tuberculosis, mortality from 
these diseases was already in serious decline 
(perhaps due to public health measures - espe-
cially improved sanitation) before the 
widespread introduction of such vaccines and 
therapies. In some cases only a very small per-
centage of the reduction in mortality rates for 
such diseases is attributable to vaccines and ther-
apies. Clearly, we should not conclude too 
quickly that improved health today is primarily 
attributable to the results of animal research. A 
Fall 1989 
Comment onJames Nelson's "Animals in 'Exemplary' Medical Research" 
stronger conclusion drawn by some is that it is in 
our own interest to abandon animal research in 
favor of much greater emphasis on preventive 
medicine, public health measures, and improved 
sanitation. Clearly, if it were in our best interest 
to do so, one would not have to argue the dif-
ficult and controversial moral case, and this 
seems preferable. 
In the case of diabetes the point, if it can be 
made at all, cannot be put so dramatically. 
Diabetes is not an infectious disease, and so 
improved sanitation does not have the impact 
that it might have on infectious diseases. Further, 
while human clinical trials and autopsies played 
an important part in understanding diabetes, 
much of the story preceding the discovery of 
insulin involved the use of animal models. For 
example, consider Robert Sharpe's claim that 
animal research could have been discarded 
because today we know from comparison of dia-
betic patients and non diabetics that maturity 
onset diabetes is often controllable with diet. 
What is presumably needed is more public edu-
cation, not more animal research (Sharpe, 173-
4). I believe this is a dangerous argument. Even if 
dietary advice is sufficient, the question must still 
be asked, how do we know what diet to rec-
ommend? A few years prior to the discovery of 
insulin, Frederick Allen showed that the then 
standard dietary approach to diabetes, relying on 
control of carbohydrate intake, was mistaken. 
Instead, Allen argued, it was the overall caloric 
intake that was overburdening the diabetic's 
system. Thus, Allen developed diets designed to 
find the balance between overburdening the 
system and starving the patient. In historical fact, 
Allen's initial research involved dogs who had 
had partial pancreatectomies and ultimately led 
to trials with patients, some of whom died of the 
cure (Bliss, 34). This prudential argument might 
have more merit were it possible to show that 
Allen could have obtained his results without the 
use of both animal and human subjects. Such 
counterfactuals are at minimum difficult to 
assess. In fairness, we should make a shift (anal-
ogous to the one discussed concerning the 
proper unit of utilitarian analysis) to something 
more institutional than Allen's own beliefs: we 
need to consider how science might have been 
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different had animal experimentation not been 
considered a possibility. Obviously, this is an 
enormously difficult claim to assess. 
Nelson's attempt to identify the notion of 
exemplary medical research can help us under-
stand the failure of such prudential arguments to 
settle the question of the advisability of animal 
research. While there are cases of less than exem-
plary research, and while public health policies 
and preven tive medicine do deserve great 
attention - perhaps more than they receive now 
(after all, shouldn't it give us some pause to have 
heard that the mortality rate of black insulin-
dependent diabetics is twice that for whites?) - it 
does not follow from a purely prudential stand-
point that all other approaches ought to be aban-
doned. That there are cases of ~exemplary 
medical research" would cut to the heart of the 
prudence objection, because these would be cases 
where it is imprudent to neglect such research. As 
difficult as it may be to obtain agreement on such 
moral questions, Nelson's approach seems to me 
to be the more responsible one. 
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Beyond the actual track record of diabetes 
research, a broader question about the notion of 
the exemplary needs to be asked. This concept 
applies insofar as research addresses a certain 
disease. That is, exemplariness is exemplified by 
all diabetes research taken as a class, rather than 
a particular research study at one time or a larger 
program of which such a study might be part. 
That this is Nelson's intention is evident for 
three reasons: first, he nowhere specifies a par-
ticular project or kind of project as "exemplary"; 
second, the second condition of the definition 
requires that exemplary research itself have an 
admirable track record, thus it cannot be limited 
to a project not yet undertaken; and third, that 
the classification is by disease is again evident 
when, in discussing the lessons ofjust war theory 
for exemplary research, Nelson says: 
Exemplary research's insistence on a 
demonstrable record of achievement in 
using animal models to ameliorate disease 
coheres nicely with the first of [the just war 
tradition's conditions] and reinforces the 
condition as a selection criterion for the 
kinds ofdiseases against which invasive animal-
based research might be emplayed. 
However, from the fact that a breakthrough in 
understanding or managing a disease (such as 
the discovery of insulin) occurred through 
animal research, it hardly follows without addi-
tional assumptions that future animal research is 
likely to be beneficial. Nelson acknowledges this 
when, despite satisfying the track record con-
dition, he still thinks it appropriate to ask 
whether continued diabetes research holds out 
much promise of answering significant questions. 
And his answer is appropriately given in terms of 
much more fine-grained classifications of 
research such as the claim that the BB rat has 
provided evidence that diabetes is or may be an 
autoimmune disease. 
This shows that what is needed in focusing the 
discussion on exemplary research is a concept of 
a class of research broad enough to have a track 
record but narrow enough to permit useful infer-
ences concerning the promise of future studies 
from truly relevant precedents. The entire history 
of diabetes research is not specific enough. The 
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BB rat's performance is much better, but I still 
would want to know what proposals relate to it 
and how it indicates their promise. 
Another reason I would hesitate to consider 
the entirety of diabetes research as exemplary is 
that there are portions of it which were scientifi-
cally questionable in their design. For example, 
once the role of the pancreas in diabetes was 
evident, it became important to ask how the pan-
creas regulated sugar metabolism - was the 
absence of pancreatic juices the key to diabetes? 
Minkowski and von Mering's work in 1889 
seemed to confirm observations of other 
researchers who had ligated or cut the ducts 
leading from pancreas to duodenum, indicating 
that such animals do not become diabetic, but 
critics at the time pointed out that ligated ducts 
might have been bypassed or replaced by new 
ones. It was not until Hedon devised a method of 
partial pancreatectomy with relocation of the 
remaining portion of the pancreas outside the 
skin that the question being asked by Minkowski 
and von Mering could be answered. It seems 
appropriate to maintain, then, that this particular 
study of Minkowski and von Mering should not 
be considered exemplary, as it posed questions 
which could not be answered suitably given the 
techniques employed. 
The upshot is that the truly exemplary must 
meet a number of conditions Nelson has not 
mentioned. I have argued it must be more nar-
rowly defined in its relation to prior successes, 
and must pose important questions which have a 
reasonable chance of being answered given pro-
posed techniques. There are undoubtedly other 
conditions; one might be that it must not target 
conditions which are avoidable (e.g., research 
concerning the adverse effects of smoking).2 
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Conscription 
Turning to nonutilitarian approaches to exem-
plary research, Nelson argues that even if we 
accept the conclusion that some kinds of animals 
have moral rights, including the rights to life and 
to be free of unnecessary and non-trivial suf-
fering, abolitionism does not follow immediately. 
A number of reasons are given, but for the sake 
of brevity I will focus on his discussion of con-
scription. Two analogies are employed in this 
context to help illuminate the situation of dia-
betes research animals: the case of young 
children who are offered as subjects by proxies 
and the case of military conscription. 
In both cases Nelson's primary point is that 
such conscription is not always wrong, since the 
individuals conscripted are members of a com-
munity and should not be conceived apart from 
that community. Their good,' in some sense, is a 
function of its good. So using young children for 
research is not a matter of judging that they 
count for less morally, but rather that the 
promotion of social good in such cases can also 
be understood as promotion of their good. 
Nelson has pointed out that these cases are dis-
analogous with animal research - even exem-
plary research - because the animals called upon 
to sacrifice cannot be considered members of our 
community, as we do little to protect their most 
basic rights, which shows that the identification of 
individual and social good is absent. I would add 
that there is a further condition on research with 
children that is important to bear in mind if that 
case is considered analogous to exemplary animal 
research: the regulations covering studies with 
more than minimal risk and no direct benefit to 
the subject require that the Institutional Review 
Board determine that the knowledge sought is of 
vital importance and that the risk is not too great 
(Brody, 266-7). So, surprisingly enough, the fact 
that we conscript children and soldiers will not 
justifY us in doing the same with animals, even in 
exemplary research. 
The case of young children stimulates a point 
somewhat at odds with Nelson's treatment. Does it 
follow from the fact that we are members of the 
community and thus our good is in some sense a 
function of the community'S good that we are abli-
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gated to subject ourselves to invasive, albeit low risk 
research for the good of others? Perhaps many 
would feel that their connectedness to others in 
their community gives them reason enough 
without obligation to act on behalf of others; but 
isn't this a gift, a departure from the stringency of 
obligation? If the situation envisioned were one in 
which a truly critical situation - a lifeboat case, if 
you will - were to arise, then perhaps we could 
argue that our sacrifice is called for by the threat 
to the community. That is, of course, the situation 
of the conscript in a just war. But the normal situ-
ation of medical research is not that of the lifeboat 
or a just war. Medical knowledge, rightly 
employed, might enable us to live longer and 
fuller lives and also enable us to die easier deaths, 
assuming we are able to cope with the problems 
such advances inevitably create, but it will not 
change the fact that we are biological organisms 
all of whom are born and all of whom will die. 
Providing further medical advances than those 
currently enjoyed is a good thing, but whatever 
the case for thinking it is owed as an obligation 
might be (and this is not often, explained), that 
value must be balanced against conscripting 
healthy individuals with significant interests at 
stake to do the dirty work. 
Occasionally defenders of research attempt to 
escape criticism by appealing to the oddity of the 
fact that our society engages in tremendous 
exploitation of animals in pursuit of less serious 
and more easily replaceable benefits than those 
sought by scientific inquiry. Criticism of scientific 
inquiry in such a context seems out of place. 
Nelson's argument might be looked at as an 
attempt to turn that argument on its head. 
Scientists themselves are committed to con-
scripting animals for communal benefits for which 
we only have a right to conscript those who 
identify with or at least stand to benefit from such 
communal efforts. Until animals become 
members of our community in more meaningful 
senses than simply serving our needs and 
interests, the justification for conscription looks 
more like the enslavement of an outsider than the 
unfortunate but necessary conscription of one of 
our own community. Perhaps one further analogy 
would help here: in the case of medical experi-
mentation with prisoners, the problem one faces 
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is the threat of coercion undermining the free 
giving of consent; to overcome this objection to 
the use of prisoners, scientists would have to show 
that certain rights of prisoners outside the experi-
mental situation are not violated. Analogously, to 
make the case for conscription of animals, scien-
tists would have to work to protect their rights in 
nonscientific contexts. 
Exemplary research is research which is most 
defensible ethically. Thus attention to the condi-
tions under which research might be exemplary 
is a promising route to pursue, though, as I have 
argued, the specification of those conditions is 
more difficult than appears at first. Once the 
moral status of animals as beings with inde-
pendent value is recognized, the position of 
animals in exemplary research is nonetheless, as 
Nelson has argued, ethically questionable, espe-
cially if we appeal to communal goods or obliga-
tions to the community to justify conscription. 
"Pastoral" 
Chickens don't scratch in the yard; 
their world is a crowded cell. 
No need to peck at anything, 
they haven't any beaks. 
Sow is immobilized for life; 
she's a living breakfast machine. 
The horses stand like statues of bone, 
with icicles on their hooves. 
Cow is full of penicillin; 
her baby's in a small, dark crate. 
There is no Old MacDonald, 
just a corporate plan for Hell. 
- Kathleen Malley 
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Letters to the Editors 
Dear Editors: 
The identification of my name under my article 
"What A Jew Should Do," in BTS, Summer, 1989, with 
the organization Jews for Jesus, struck me with the 
same hilarity Mark Twain felt reading his obituary in a 
newspaper. His response became memorable: "Reports 
of my death have been wildly exaggerated." I wish I 
could match that. My response will have to remain 
standard, though it has an historical resonance: 
I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of or 
associated with Jews for Jesus. My organization is Jews 
for Animal Rights. Our goals and methods are tradi-
tional and available to all Jews. 
- Roberta Kalechofsky 
Jews for Animal Rights 
The Editors sincerely regret the foregoing error. 
A Re.vly To My Critics 
The nastiness of Professor Schwartz and a serious 
misunderstanding on the part of Ms. Kalechofsky do 
not inspire one to want to reply. I fear, however, that if 
I say nothing, readers will be left with the impression 
that I am unable to defend myself. Reluctantly, I begin. 
It is true that I thought Schwartz was a "reform" 
Jew but my article was not, as Ms. Kalechofsky claims, 
based on the premise that Schwartz is "reform" and 
Rabbi Bleich "orthodox." Much of my piece sketches a 
history of the development of doctrine and it is during 
that sketch that I try to make clear my basic premises, 
which are as follows. Devout Jews need nothing more 
than the Torah if they are intelligent as well as devout. 
I painted a picture of the growth of the Mishnah and 
Talmudic scholarship as the effort of certain Jews to 
usurp the right of '1ay" Jews to think for themselves. I 
drew an analogy with certain Catholic prohibitions 
upon "laymen," circa 1000 C.E., not to read the Bible. 
Implicit in my paper is the idea that there is no 
injunction in the Torah itself to take the Mishnah and 
Talmud as more holy or about as holy as Torah itself. I 
presented excerpts from classical "sages" that strike 
the unprejudiced Jew who has no axe to grind as 
absurdities on their face. Example: that we may torture 
a dead kings horse as a way of paying respect to him. 
As a philosopher, I am committed to the idea that 
people are only free when they stop slavishly accepting 
the opinions of "greater persons" and think every 
important issue through for themselves. 
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